Pragmatic trials aim to directly inform health care decision-making through the collection of so-called ‘real world data’ from observations of comparative treatment effects in clinical practice. In order to ensure the applicability and feasibility of a pragmatic trial, design features may be necessary that deviate from standard research ethics requirements. Examples are traditional requirements to seek written informed consent and to perform extensive data and safety monitoring. Proposals for deviations from standard research ethics practice have resulted in controversy about their (...) ethical acceptability. One of the justifications for altered procedures is the allegedly high social value of pragmatic trials. In order to properly operationalize the concept in the ethical assessment of pragmatic trial designs, specification is warranted. We identified three determinants from common claims about a pragmatic trial's social value: the extent to which the research question has real world relevance, the trial design's ability to generate a real world answer and the probability of direct uptake of the results by decision-makers in practice. Subsequently, we discuss how these determinants should be applied to the practice of pragmatic trials, and to what extent they might be applicable to explanatory trials. (shrink)

In April 2020, close to the start of the first U.K. COVID-19 lockdown, the U.K. government announced the development of a COVID-19 contact tracing app, which was later trialled on the U.K. island, the Isle of Wight, in May/June 2020. United Kingdom surveys found general support for the development of such an app, which seemed strongly influenced by public trust. Institutions developing the app were called upon to fulfil the commitment to public trust by acting with trustworthiness. Such calls presuppose (...) that public trust associated with the app can emerge if the conditions for trustworthiness are met and that public trust is simplistic, i.e., linearly the sum of each member of the publics’ individual – U.K. government trust relationship. Drawing on a synthesis of the trust literature and fifteen interviews with members of the public trialling the app on the Isle of Wight, this paper aims to explore what trust mechanisms and relationships are at play when thinking about public trust in the context of the U.K. COVID-19 app. We argue that public trust is a complex social phenomenon and not linearly correlated with institutional trustworthiness. As such, attention needs to widen from calls for trustworthy infrastructures as a way to build public trust, to a deeper understanding of those doing the trusting; in particular, what or whom do people place their trust in when considering whether using the app and why. An understanding of this will help when trying to secure public trust during the implementation of necessary public health measures. (shrink)

This essay is about the ensuing problem that in general it is nothelpful to talk about non-standard knowledge practices as modeled after our Western ideas of what knowledge is. It negotiates this problem by arguing that artisanal knowledge is an independent and self-contained mode of knowledge and is arranged in three parts. In the first part an outline is given of the key assumptions of the interactionist conception of knowledge that needs to be put in place as an alternative to (...) the basically Kantian mixture of empiricist and rationalist assumptions of the folk model of Western academic thinking about knowledge. In this interactionist conception of knowledgeartisanal knowledge gets center stage. In the second part, the notion of craftknowledge is opened up as much as possible. The third and final part takes upthe question whether craft knowledge is a cultural universal. (shrink)

Modern epistomology has been dominated by an empiricist theory of knowledge that assumes a direct individualistic relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Truth is held to be universal, and non-individualistic social and cultural factors are considered sources of distortion of true knowledge. Since the late 1950s, this view has been challenged by a cognitive relativism asserting that what is true is socially conditioned. This volume examines the far-reaching implications of this development for the social sciences. Recently, (...) cognitive relativism has become a key issue of debate in anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. In anthropology this is illustrated by a growing awareness of the similarity of all systems of knowledge. In philosophy it is exemplified by the realization that traditional monolithic and absolutist concepts of truth have increasingly lost any power to make sense and to convince. In sociology it is visible in a renewal of interest in a general sociology of knowledge. Yet, in spite of this convergence of interests, practitioners of these three disciplines have on the whole shown no inclination to reach a consensus on the terms of reference that could facilitate an interdisciplinary approach. "Cognitive Relativism and Social Science "aims to do just this. It is a working assumption of this volume that, as far as the subject of cognitive relativism is concerned, anthropologists, philosophers, and sociologists should join forces rather than try to deal with the challenges of cognitive relativism within strictly imposed boundaries that normally separate academic disciplines. Only when they work together will it be possible to treat the problems posed by cognitive relativism in an adequate way. This volume provides the results of attempts to communicate on cognitve relativism across disciplinary boundaries. This is must reading in the philosophy of social science and in social research theory. (shrink)

Durkheim écrit ce livre avec un but double : d'abord il voulait expliquer ce qui crée une société, ce qui la tient ensemble ; ensuite il voulait éclaircir l'influence qu'a la société sur la pensée logique. Pour Durkheim, la religion est la clé utilisée pour déverrouiller ces deux problématiques.Dans ce livre, Durkheim argumente que les représentations religieuses sont en fait des représentations collectives : l'essence du religieux ne peut être que le sacré. Il est une caractéristique qui se trouve universellement (...) dans toutes les religions. Le sacré, être collectif et impersonnel, représente ainsi la société elle-même. Ensuite il argumente que la société a un impact majeur dans la genèse de la pensée logique. C'est la société qui fournit à l'individu les catégories (le temps, l'espace, le nombre etc.) et les concepts nécessaires pour la pensée logique. (shrink)

Em artigo inédito, Franklin Leopoldo e Silva desenvolve os sentidos da memória na produção da identidade, destacando as relações significativas do presente com o passado e o futuro na construção da história. Desse ponto, o autor acentua o papel das instituições nesse processo – um processo de exercício de poder, no qual se tem, na verdade, a institucionalização do poder – e, dentre elas, em particular a instituição universitária.

gl. 1. Ėkofilosofii︠a︡ kak zhiznesokhrani︠a︡i︠u︡shchiĭ kulʹturnyĭ proekt -- gl. 2. Obrazy kulʹtury mira v istoriko-personologicheskom izmerenii -- gl. 3. Borʹba za mir v sovremennom mire : opyt, kont︠s︡ept︠s︡ii, modeli resheniĭ.

Alfred Edward Housman (1859–1936), ki je kasneje postal angleški pesnik in eden največjih filologov svojega časa, je svoj zafrkantski »fragment« objavil pri triindvajsetih, leta 1883, v reviji Bromsgrovian. Revijo je izdajala Bromsgrove School, kjer se je šolal kot najstnik (1870–77); na šolo, ki je prva prepoznala njegov jezikovni in pesniški talent, se je za kratek čas (1881–82) vrnil kot pomožni učitelj po ne­pričakovanem študijskem porazu na Oxfordu. Kot ugotavlja Ralph Marcellino, ni naključje, da besedilo paro­dira predvsem Ajshila, ki je bil (...) Housmanov najljubši pesnik. V njem odzvanja Oresteja, zlasti drami Agamemnon in Prinašalke pitnih darov, verjetno zato, ker so ju dijaki na šoli, kjer je poučeval, pri pouku največ brali. Prav ta ciljna publika je znala ceniti norčevanje iz retoričnih figur ter sintaktičnih konstrukcij, ki jim jih je njihov pomožni učitelj vbijal v glavo. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa analisar, a partir do pensamento do filósofo Michel Foucault, o exercício da liberdade sob uma perspectiva ética, no âmbito do estoicismo tardio. Liberdade essa que se faz possível a partir do cuidado de si, por meio de exercícios regulares que possibilitam ao indivíduo viver a vida como arte. Com efeito, é na prática do cuidado de si, que o indivíduo se coloca como transformador do mundo e de si mesmo, o qual dá-se no encontro com o (...) outro, longe de ser uma experiência solitária com o próprio eu, realiza-se na associação com outrem. (shrink)

Neste livro Gombrich discute as idéias e as posturas específicas que tiveram influência decisiva na prática da arte renascentista. Todos os estudos aqui reunidos tratam de algo a que se pode chamar clima renascentista de opiniões sobre a arte, além da influência desse clima sobre a prática e a crítica da arte.

É bem conhecida a oposição estabelecida por Kant entre experiência possível e dialética, na medida em que esta última é caracterizada como a “lógica da ilusão”. Ao mesmo tempo, o modo de pensar metafísico, que ocorre dialeticamente, em sentido kantiano, é uma tendência inevitável da razão, expressa na exigência formal de completude das categorias. Como o pensar, enquanto exercício livre da razão, é em si mesmo mais amplo do que a atividade de conhecer, própria do entendimento, o pensar contém o (...) conhecimento, embora este se qualifique pelas regras e pelos limites determinantes da objetividade. A pergunta que tentaremos formular é se essa relação continente-conteúdo não poderia configurar também uma dependência da experiência em relação ao raciocínio dialético, que estaria de algum modo indicada na função reguladora das idéias da razão. Nesse caso, a oposição formal entre conhecer e pensar seria inseparável da inclusão estrutural (dependência) da experiência no âmbito da razão. Na raiz do problema estaria talvez a tensão (dialética) entre a aspiração subjetiva de totalidade e as exigências objetivas de limitação e segmentação da experiência e a forma da experiência teria de ser finalmente concebida a partir de um fundo de inteligibilidade problemática. Dialectics and experienceThe separation of possible experience as objective knowledge and dialetics as a non-objective or non-theoretical knowledge is one of the most important aspects of kantian critical philosophy. But Kant also says that the activity of reason, as a pure thinking, has more amplitude than understanding knowledge. So we could say that theoric knowledge would depend on rational ( and non-theoretical) knowledge, as something contained in it. If we accept that, the consequence would be a relation of dependence between the form of objective knowledge and the background of a problematic – even doubtful – inteligible knowledge. (shrink)

In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...) to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

Los recientes desarrollos de la inteligencia artificial generativa suponen desafíos a conceptos tradicionales del Derecho, uno de ellos es el de autoría. El problema que aborda este trabajo es cómo concebir la autoría de una obra escrita por una inteligencia artificial generativa en la que la intervención humana, en cuestiones de estilo y contenido, es nula o mínima. Para ello se enumeran casos recientes en los que se plantea ese problema a partir de artículos escritos empleando ese tipo de tecnología. (...) Pero el objetivo del trabajo es la revisión de la concepción de autoría que subyace a las normativas internacionales que regulan la propiedad intelectual y los presupuestos éticos que las justifican (la concepción de Locke, la concepción romántica y la concepción utilitarista). Sobre la base de una lectura de “¿Qué es un autor?” de Michel Foucault se sostiene que la noción de autoría cumple una función social que, al menos al estado del arte de la inteligencia artificial generativa, esta no puede cumplir y, por tanto, no debe ser reconocida como autora de las obras mencionadas. Concluyendo que las obras literarias elaboradas por inteligencia artificial generativa multipropósito con nula o escasa intervención humana deben ser consideradas como obras de dominio público. (shrink)

Let X be any infinite, coinfinite r.e. set. We show that the index set $\{e: W_e \equiv_1 X\}$ is Σ 0 3 -complete, answering a question posed by Odifreddi in [2].

O objetivo deste texto é explorar aproximações e divergências no pensamento de Paulo Freire e Ivan Illich na forma como eles vêem a relação entre educação e transformação social. Acredita-se que a retomada da polêmica Freire e Illich sobre o problema educação e transformação social pode contribuir para melhor compreender e esclarecer a verdadeira natureza desse problema, já clássico na história da educação moderna.

ResumoO argumento do milagre afirma que o realismo científico é a melhor explicação para o sucesso da ciência:teorias científicas são bem-sucedidas porque são verdadeiras, e cientistas são bem-sucedidos em encontrarteorias verdadeiras porque se baseiam em normas metodológicas confiáveis. A tese da incomensurabilidademetodológica afirma que teorias científicas não são escolhidas através de um algoritmo neutro de normas epistêmicas. Isso revela uma lacuna na explicação realista: normas epistêmicas confiáveis não são suficientes para conduzir a escolhas de teorias verdadeiras, pois tais escolhas também (...) são determinadas por outros fatores além de normas epistêmicas. A introdução de fatores adicionais como subdeterminando a escolha de teorias engendrou argumentos relativistas e antirrealistas contra o realismo. A explicação realista pode ser reabilitada se postular que os cientistas possuem autoridade epistêmica para aprimorar as normas metodológicas da ciência, sendo aptos a tomar decisões autônomas em vez de regidas por regras.AbstractThe no miracles argument claims that scientific realism is the best explanation to science’s success: scientifictheories are empirically successful because they are truthlike, and scientists are successful in theory-choices because they rely on reliable methodological norms. The methodological incommensurability thesis claims that there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice. It reveals a gap in the realist explanation: reliable epistemic norms are not sufficient to guarantee successful theory-choices, because theory- choices are also determined by other factors besides epistemic norms. The introduction of additional factors as underdetermining theory-choices motivates relativist and antirealist positions. But the realist explanation can be rehabilitated if it postulates that scientists have epistemic authority to develop methodological norms, being apt to take decisions which are autonomous rather than rule-driven. (shrink)